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The currently conventional assumption that long distance migration is a novel phenomenon 
can only be described as bizarre: our species has constantly been on the move since Homo 
Sapiens emerged from the savannahs of Africa 100,000 years ago, and promptly set about 
peopling the world. Nor did our ancestors stay put in the locations which they initially 
colonised. Long before Europeans set off to ‘discover’ the New World, and in due course to 
claim sovereignty over large parts of it, members of all manner of other civilizations were 
spreading their own traditions far and wide. It was on that basis that Islam expanded across 
an arena stretching the Atlantic to the Pacific, whilst Hindu and Buddhist ideas and 
ideologies had had a far reaching impact on the civilizations of central, east, and south east 
Asia long before Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope. This is not to suggest that 
the expanding spatial influence of these religious and cultural traditions was simply a product 
of migration and conquest: in most cases inflow of personnel on that basis was dwarfed by 
the much larger number of people who found themselves so inspired by the newcomers’ ideas 
and ideologies that they voluntarily incorporated them into their own more indigenous 
lifestyles.  
But just who engaged in these migratory activities?  Why and on what basis did they set out 
for their destinations? And just how did they behave after their arrival?  
Conventionally-minded Euro-American social commentators assumed they knew the answer. 
Drawing on their knowledge of the operation of the Roman Empire, as well as of the way in 
which their own immediate ancestors had also implemented a parallel ‘civilizing mission’ on 
an equally militaristic basis, they all too easily assumed that all similar initiatives must also 
have been underpinned by force. But as closer inspection is beginning to reveal, whilst the 
willingness of crusading  European adventurers to deploy force as a means of getting their 
way was by no means unprecedented, such tactics were far less ‘normal’ in a global context 
than either the perpetrators or their apologists so readily assumed. Long-distance trade, 
conducted on a commercial and hence a peaceful basis, was in fact a much more 
commonplace foundation for the diasporic transmission of religious and cultural influences. 
Have those days now entirely passed? It would be idle to assume so. To be sure much has 
changed in the contemporary world, especially as a result of the impact of currently much 
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vaunted processes of globalisation. But whilst those processes and their consequences are real 
enough, the label which is currently deployed to identify them needs to be approached with 
some care, especially in the light of the caveats above. Once we consider world history in 
from a global perspective, rather than through parochial spectacles still worn by most natives 
of the westerly peninsular of the Asiatic landmass, it is quite clear processes about which 
Euro-American observers have recently become so excited have a far longer history than is 
currently assumed.  
Once globalisation is considered from this perspective, the any assumption that Euro-
America always was – or can for very much longer be expected to remain – the ultimate 
global hub must be abandoned. To be sure the inhabitants of this region have enjoyed the 
benefits of imperially driven position of competitive advantage, no less in military than in 
economic terms, for the best part of two centuries. However that position of competitive 
advantage has been undermined at bewildering speed as the result of recent advances in 
communications technology. As result goods, people and above all information can now be 
transferred around the globe at an unprecedented speed, and at an ever-diminishing cost. As 
the global arena has ‘shrunk’ in this sense, there has been a sharp acceleration in the scale of 
transnational activity of all kinds. The world has become unprecendentedly mobile.  
Yet this has also been accompanied by the introduction of ever more draconian constraints on 
the mobility of certain kinds of people. Hence whilst recent technological developments have 
ensured that both information and value (in the financial sense) can now be transferred 
around the globe with no significant let or hindrance, and tariff restriction on the transfer of 
goods (and most especially manufactured goods) have by now been all-but eliminated,  
constraints on the movement of people are becoming steadily more draconian. However 
current patterns of boundary control are highly selective. Whilst offering the minimal level of 
hindrance to the great mass of ‘legitimate’ border crossers,  they aim carefully to sieve out all 
those deemed to be unwelcome.  Hence even though the scale of long-distance travel has 
increased has grown by leaps and bounds in recent year, all those unfortunate enough to hold 
passports issued either by poverty-stricken or by ‘terrorist-generating’ states now find it next 
to impossible to cross international boundaries – unless they possesses either sufficient 
wealth or sufficiently impressive credentials to persuade the border guards to let them pass.  
Boundaries show no sign of disappearing in our ever more globalised world. Instead 
‘immigration’ – or in other words the passage of the ‘unwanted’ through, around, or beneath 
such barriers has recently become an explosive political issue throughout the developed 
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world. It also follows that term ‘immigrant’ needs careful decoding. Popular hostility is 
relatively rarely directed at those who arrive from elsewhere in the developed world (the so-
called North), or indeed at those with advanced professional and technical qualifications from 
the otherwise poverty-stricken South – always provided that they only arrive in ones and 
twos. In contrast the ‘real’ immigrants, or in other words those who are the focus of popular 
concern, are those whose roots lie in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and who arrive en 
masse to fulfil menial roles in Northern labour market. Even though there may be a ready 
market for their labour, such migrants find themselves subjected to ever tighter restrictions, 
on the grounds that their presence offers an unacceptable threat to the integrity of the 
established socio-cultural order, and hence to national integrity.  
A View from Below 
Southern perspectives on these issues differ radically from that which has crystallised in the 
North. Those who view these processes ‘from below’ are invariably acutely aware that the 
current processes of globalisation did not emerge in the context of a homogeneous world 
order: rather they took off just as the condition of hegemonic prosperity which the 
populations of Euro-America had begun to take for granted were the product of two centuries 
of Imperial expansion, and now that the imperial edifice was on its last legs, the centre of 
gravity of the global economy had begun to shift back to the regions in which it had lain for 
several thousand years beforehand: in southern and eastern Asia. For Euro-Americans the 
result of this reversion is proving to be traumatic. Hubristically convinced of their own 
necessary superiority, they failed to appreciate spot the extent to which their now liberated 
southern and eastern rivals were not only borrowing Euro-America’s recent scientific and 
technical achievements, but playing them back in spades. By continuing to trade in goods, 
rather being seduced by make-believe potentiality of Ponzi schemes, Asia (although not the 
South as a whole) has found itself holding most of the cash, whilst Euro-America has found 
itself holding most of the debt. Nemesis had struck. However seemingly invincible the forces 
globalisation from above might have appeared to its hubristic beneficiaries, the counter-
hegemonic forces of globalisation ‘from below’ are steadily eroding the positions of 
advantage which they had come to regard as their by right.  
From that perspective there is indeed a logic to current patterns of hostility towards 
‘immigrants’. Just as the shift in manufacturing from west to east has led to millions of 
industrial workers in Euro-America losing their well-paid jobs, so the arrival of large 
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numbers of long-distance labour migrants able and willing to fulfil the menial tasks which 
indigenous workers had been only too willing to abandon in the years of prosperity has 
confronted them with a new so of local competition as recession has set in. Worse still, 
migrants of peasant origin, and whose entrepreneurial capacities who had not been eroded by 
generations of reliance on the comfort and security of wages labour, have proved far more 
successful at operating on their own account in innumerable small businesses than their now-
redundant indigenous counterparts.  
In structural terms both developments have had similar distributive consequences: a 
diminution of the established patterns of inequality between North and South, achieved by 
means of a redistribution of material assets from (some) Northerners to (some) Southerners.  
Viewed ‘from below’ such developments appear to be nothing more than welcome benefits 
which have accrued as result of wholly legitimate self-resources competitive initiatives; 
meanwhile those self-same developments are routinely regarded as illegitimately 
transgressive when viewed from above. However the purpose of this Chapter is not to expand 
further on these dialectic processes in abstract terms, but rather to explore the specific 
resources and strategies on which South Asian migrants have relied to achieve these results, 
as well as the institutional strategies which the UK authorities have recently begun to deploy 
to contain and control their counter-hegemonic initiatives.  
Across the kala pani: the growth of South Asian transnational networks 
Despite the injunctions of Brahminical orthodoxy which suggested that those who left the 
shores of Bharat and crossed the kala pani to overseas destination would suffer a loss of 
purity by so doing, South Asians had been contravening that principle for many centuries 
before Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope. Long-distance travels around the 
Indian Ocean, as well as back and forth across the passes of the Himalayas were already a 
feature of the South Asian world long before the beginning of European activity in the region 
(Chaudhury 1985). Unfortunately those who travelled beyond the shores of the subcontinent 
to engaged in such journeys left far fewer records of their experiences than did incoming 
visitors such as Al Biruni and Ibn Batuta from the Arabic-speaking world and Fa Hsiang 
from China; nevertheless the scale of Indic influence – no less in Hindu than Buddhist 
formats – over a great arc running from central Asia through Japan and China to southeast 
Asia and Indonesia provides indisputable evidence that the traffic was by no means one-way.  
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Much of that traffic was seaborne, and was carried around the Indian Ocean and the South 
China Sea through long-distance mercantile networks which were already well-established in 
Roman times. But it was only with the emergence of Islam in the seventh century C.E., and 
with it the rapid adoption of the new faith by many of the traders operating out of the Red Sea 
and the Persian Gulf on the long haul to Daybol, Calicut and onwards through the straights of 
Malacca to Canton that we begin to have access to records (in Arabic) which enable us to 
gain an insight into the ways in which such networks operated (Chaudhury 1985: 34 ff).  
 
Long-distance trade of this kind has always been a specialist operation, especially during the 
lengthy period prior to the availability of instant global communication by electronic means. 
In addition to knowledge of the location and character market opportunities in a wide swathe 
of locations, successful merchants also needed to find some way of constructing coalitions of 
mutual trust to sustain the financial logistics of their spatially extended operations (Ballard 
2005), an objective which they regularly achieved by establishing collateral branches of their 
families in all the major ports in which they did business. Networks constructed on this basis 
emerged from a wide range of localities throughout the region, including Christians from 
Armenia, Jews from Baghdad, Muslims from Basra and the Yemen, Hindus from Gujarat and 
Malabar, and Chinese from Fujian. So it was that by the time the initial harbingers of future 
European Imperial dominance found their way into the Indian Ocean, substantial colonies of 
transnational1 entrepreneurs could be found in all the region’s major trading hubs.  
 
But whilst the process of European imperial expansion was also transnational in a similar 
sense, the networks through which these processes were implemented were quite different in 
character. In the first place they were invariably commercially and military operations 
operating under a Royal (and monopolistic) imprimatur; secondly their ships were invariably 
equipped with heavy weapons, such they were frequently able to contract the trading deals 
under military duress; thirdly the interpersonal relationships between those engaged in such 
enterprises were ordered in contractual terms, rather than being grounded in kinship 
reciprocity; and last but not least they preferred to treat ‘the natives’ whom they encountered  
with infinite disdain, because they failed to appreciate the intrinsic superiority of Christianity, 
and the allegedly enlightened civilization which they held that their beliefs supported.  
                                                 
1  It is worth noting that the use of the term ‘transnational’ in the period prior to European expansion, or 
even prior to the early nineteenth century should be regarded as an anachronism, since nation-states in 
the contemporary sense were unknown in the earlier period. Hence trans-local, or perhaps better still 
trans-jurisdictional could well be a more appropriate epithet for all networks of this kind. 
 6 
But despite their hegemonic aspiration, the early European transnationalists soon found that 
their targets were not a push-over, especially in the Indian Ocean region. Despite the weight 
of arms which they brought with them, they found they had little in the way of tradable goods 
to offer counterparties – at least until the opening up of the silver mines of Potosí gave them 
access to what amounted to ‘free-money’ (Frank 1998). Hence the most significant initial 
impact of their arrival in Indian  Ocean region was to boost the level of liquidity in both the 
Indian and Chinese economies, and hence to expand the scale of the manufacturing activity – 
particularly in the sphere of textiles and ceramics – in the entire region. Nevertheless the 
Europeans were never content with mere trade: their ultimate objective was domination, not 
just of the seas, but the land as well. However it took several centuries before the growing 
might of European military technology enabled them to make substantial progress on the 
latter front, and not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that European 
manufacturing capabilities finally overwhelmed those of India and China.  
 
However the imposition of Imperial hegemony swiftly proved to be a double edged sword. 
Whilst its downside began cut deeply into indigenous manufacturing capacity, and appeared 
at first sight to have entirely overwhelmed all the region’s indigenous long-distance trading 
networks, which were soon reduced to peripheralised shadows of their former selves, all was 
not lost. In due course Pax Britannica opened up a host of novel entrepreneurial opportunities 
of which Her Britannic Majesty’s new-found subjects of began to take active advantage. 
However the precise basis on which this occurred varied from region to region.   
 
Hence in his study of ‘the ways in which two groups of South Asian merchants managed to 
carve themselves a niche in a European-dominated world economy’ Markovits (2000) echoes 
the observations of Pan (1994) for the Chinese when he emphasises that emigration did not 
take not take the form of a generalised outflow from across the length breadth of the 
subcontinent. Rather he shows that it was initially confined to areas such as Sindh, 
Saurashtra, Gujarat and Kerala, all of which had been the home base of a multiplicity of long-
distance trading networks in the pre-Imperial period. Pan makes the same point with respect 
to Fukien and Kwangtung. Nor was the outflow generalised in these narrower regional 
contexts either. Rather the entrepreneurs were invariably based in specific towns and villages, 
and very often specific castes as well. Moreover in the South Asian context virtually all the 
early migrants shared a common historical background in banking and business activity – no 
matter whether they were drawn from Muslim, Hindu, Jain, Sikh and Parsee or Hindu 
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communities. And whilst the recruitment base undoubtedly grew wider during the course of 
the twentieth century to include whose traditional occupational role was either as craftsmen 
of peasant farmers, prior connectivity remained crucial. Hence when mass migration took off  
from the middle of the twentieth century onwards largely in a response to demands of more 
or less unskilled labour in the Middle East and Western Europe, those who took off were 
either drawn from the same areas along the coast of western India from which their trading 
predecessors were drawn, or failing that from equally specific locations in Punjab and 
Bengal, largely as a result of a series of highly specific contingencies which had led British 
steamships companies to recruit stokers from each of these regions from the 1880s onwards 
(Ballard 2003).  
 
In South Asia no less than China each such migrant outflow developed separately, in a 
manner which was initially largely dependent on specific set of local contingencies; but once 
set in motion such the processes remained unstoppable. Escalators of chain migration which 
first started rolling decades ago are for the most part still active to this day. This raises a 
pressing question: just what was the character underlying resources which drove and 
maintained the internal structure of these transcontinental networks?  
Translocal networks  
Although Markovits does nit manage to produce a full solution to this conundrum – most 
probably because of the limited character of the information which could be squeezed from 
the historical sources on which relies  – his analysis nevertheless goes a long way towards 
identifying its most salient features. First of all he highlights the dynamic characteristics of 
these networks as: 
Structure[s] through which goods, credit, capital and men circulate regularly across a 
given space which can vary enormously in terms of both size and accessibility. A 
network generally consists of a centre, a locality or a cluster of localities where 
capital is raised and where capitalists have their main place of residence, and of 
dispersed colonies of merchants and commercial employees which keep close links 
with the network centre.  
Between the network centre, on the one hand, and the dispersed colonies, on the 
other hand, goods, but also men (and sometimes women), credit and information 
circulate. While goods may also circulate widely outside the network (otherwise there 
would not be any exchange), men, credit and information circulate almost exclusively 
within it….   
It is the capacity of the merchants to maintain a constant flow of information within 
the network that ensures its success. This means two things: first, that 'leaks' have to 
be avoided as much as possible to the outside world, secondly, that information must 
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circulate smoothly within the network, both spatially and temporally, as it gets 
transmitted from one generation to another… The most successful merchant 
networks have been those most able to process information into a body of knowledge 
susceptible of continuous refinement.  
 
On this basis he then goes on to discuss the most crucial issues of all in such circumstances: 
credibility and credit. As he puts it  
…. credit circulates within the network, generally at rates which are lower than the 
market rate, and without collateral. This opens up the delicate question of trust. … 
We are told that preferential rates and the absence of collateral are explained by the 
existence of a bond of trust between the lender and the borrower. The existence of 
this bond of trust is in its turn generally related to kinship, caste and community 
Markovits 2000: 25).  
But just how and on what basis are these bonds of trust maintained? Markovits gives careful 
consideration to the available options, but finds them all wanting. Whilst he accepts that 
kinship is an essential ingredient of all such networks, he nevertheless concludes that its 
importance can be exaggerated, on the grounds of his observation that business partnerships 
are often concluded between non-kin, albeit most usually still between men who belong to 
the same community. Likewise he dismisses the prospect that religion, at least in its wider 
categorical sense, might be the foundation for such bonds of trust:  
neither Hindu nor Muslim merchants represented homogenous entities. Between the 
strongly institutionalized religion of the Nattukottai Chettiar bankers, whose Shaivite 
temples served as clearing-houses, and the much more fluid religious universe of the 
Sind Hindu merchants, there was very little in common, [even though both] … could 
be defined as 'Hindus'.  
The same diversity is perceptible among Muslim merchants; between the religious 
practices and social institutions of the Shi’a merchants, both Khoja and Bohra, and 
those of Sunni merchants, there was also a wide gap. Even among Sunnis, Memons 
clearly differentiated themselves from other groups (ibid: 26). 
Yet despite his well-taken scepticism of explanatory theses grounded in generalised 
assertions about the common characteristics of ‘Hindus’, ‘Muslims’, ‘Gujaratis’ and so forth, 
one point stands out with clarity in the midst of his careful analysis: the roots of almost every 
network he examines is invariably intensely parochial in character, no matter how global its 
diasporic tentacles may subsequently have become.  
 
But whilst Pan makes just the same point about Chinese networks, there is one additional 
feature of parochiality which has had (and continues to have) a major impact in Indic 
contexts: South Asian migrants’ deep-rooted commitment to endogamy, no less on sectarian 
grounds than those of caste, as a result of which marital ties have played an exceptionally 
salient role in the development and maintenance of their translocal networks.  
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The maintenance of trust and reciprocity in the absence of face-to-face interaction  
 In normal circumstances the patterns of trust and reciprocity which underpin all our most 
significant social relationships are played out within, and hence regularly renewed as a result 
of, face-to-face interactions. However the moment inter-personal networks become spatially 
extended,  such face-to-face interactions on a quotidian basis will of necessity come to a halt 
– with the result that there is a very real prospect that patterns of trust and reciprocity once 
sustained by such interactions will steadily weaken, so much so that they may ultimately fall 
into abeyance. How, then, can the prospect of such an outcome be countered in long-distance 
transnational networks?  
 
Of all the relationships in which we participate, those of kinship are amongst the most 
resistant to erosion in the face of absence of face-to-face personal contact. But in the absence 
of any kind of communication even they will tend to wane in significance as the years pass 
by. It follows that regular communication of some kind is prerequisite for the maintenance of 
such relationships, which can thereby be sustained even if direct face-to-face contact is 
postponed for years or even decades. This is where Markovits’ emphasis on the dynamic 
character of successful long-distance networks is so crucial: it is precisely the many forms of 
circulation which such networks facilitate which accounts for their resilience. In this respect 
my own observations suggest that one particular form of circulation has been a salient feature 
of South Asian network: that of women. If males are the initial pioneers – as has almost 
invariably been the case in South Asian diasporic contexts – by far the best way by means of 
those left back home can ensure the continued loyalty of those settled overseas, and by means 
of which those settled overseas can likewise ensure that they still have a secure place back 
home despite their absence, is by making appropriate marriages, both on their own behalf, 
and behalf of their offspring. In other words it is marriage alliances – or to put it another way 
the circulation of women as between all the available nodes in the network – offers a highly 
effective means of ensuring their integrity over the generations. All this also has counter-
intuitive consequences: far from undermining the strength of kinship bonds, spatial separation 
often reinforces their significance, especially when they provide the foundation of actively 
articulated translocal networks.   
  
Given that long distance migration is normally much more of a collective than an individual 
exercise, transnational networks routinely develop their own dynamic. It is easy to see why 
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that should be so. In well-articulated networks every participant has reason to regard 
network-membership as a valuable asset. Beside providing all involved with access to a 
constantly developing range of entrepreneurial opportunities, their capacity to facilitate the 
long-distance circulation of capital, credit, information and reliable manpower yet further 
reinforces their capacity to make  the most of novel opportunities, whenever and wherever 
they occur within their network’s translocally extended arena. The result of all this serves to 
promote what Greif (1989) identified – on the basis of his exploration of the business 
practices of mediaeval Jewish traders operating across the length and breadth of the Maghreb 
– as self-regulating coalitions of reciprocity. However there is nothing specifically mediaeval 
about coalitions of this kind. Besides being widely cited by scholars exploring contemporary 
trading structures, I myself have found his model extremely illuminating in the course of my 
analyses of the operation of contemporary Hawala networks (Ballard 2005, 2006).  
 
In more abstract terms specific characteristics of Greif’s analysis of the significance of 
coalition membership are worth noting at this stage: 
i. Membership of such a coalition is a valuable asset: it gives access to all manner 
of opportunities denied to outsiders. 
ii. Failure to fulfil ones obligations of reciprocity is potentially catastrophic: loss of 
coalition membership leads to exclusion from those opportunities 
iii. The resultant sanctions are as spatially extended as the network itself: all the 
transgressor’s kinsfolk, wherever they are resident, are likely to find themselves 
branded as untrustworthy unless they also publicly distance themselves from the 
transgressor.  
It is precisely these intertwined processes of positive and negative feedback that underpin the 
capacity of such coalitions to self-regulate themselves, even in situations where face-to-face 
interactions between major players in the network are relatively rare. 
 
It follows that the use of coalitions of reciprocity to build and maintain spatially extended 
networks is in no sense a novelty, or phenomenon unique to South Asia: rather all such 
networks invariably have a long history behind them, and such developments can in principle 
be expected to be a universal phenomenon. Nevertheless the speed of their emergence as well 
as the course and character of their subsequent trajectories are conditioned by three key 
variables: firstly the ease and effective with the resources of their members prior cultural 
capital can be deployed and reinterpreted to facilitate the process of network construction; 
secondly the patterns of opportunity and constraint present in the socio-economic  niche into 
 11
which they launch their initiative; and secondly the wholly unpredictable contingencies 
which to alerted those in the right place at the right time to the opportunities – or to put it 
more explicitly the potentially exploitable niches – available at some distant destination. 
Significant processes of network building, whether on a trans-local, a trans-national or a 
trans-continental scale, will only occur when all three of these variables are favourably 
configured; and given that the wider socio-economic environment is subject to constant 
change as Empires rise and fall, they must also have the good fortune to strike when the time 
is ripe.  
 
However over an above all these specificities, a common element in all such structures is the 
maintenance of relationships of mutual trust and reciprocity amongst network members. It 
follows that such structures are at least as much moral as economic in character; moreover all 
by observations suggest that such a sense of moral solidarity is most easily founded in 
reciprocities of kinship, or alternatively in common religious – more precisely sectarian – 
affiliation. Not only does this obviate the need to create a moral order from scratch, since this 
one of the key elements of their cultural capital on which migrants invariably rely, but it also 
provides a ready foundation for further network-extension. Hence far from eroding the force 
of kinship reciprocity, the long-distance extension of such relationships within the context of 
transnational networks invariably adds significantly to their force, since they now have an 
additional purpose to fulfil: to sustain the structure of the network itself. Moreover kinship is 
a much more fluid phenomenon than is commonly appreciated. Hence in translocal contexts 
relationships of quasi-kinship – in which those who encounter each other in distant contexts 
build relationships of reciprocity between themselves as if they were much more closely 
related than they are in genetic terms – is a commonplace feature of trans-local networks, 
especially during their early phases of development. Moreover such alliances can readily be 
turned into relationships of real kinship marry their offspring to one another. 
 
Nevertheless if the carrot-and-stick dimensions of coalitions of reciprocity are to operate 
effectively, clear boundaries also need to be established. Here a further dimension of Indic 
behavioural conventions comes into their own: the widespread commitment to caste 
endogamy. Hence the rules of endogamy are invariably just as strictly (if not more strictly) 
enforced in diasporic contexts as in South Asia itself.  Sectarian loyalties frequently serve just 
the same function. Tariqa-based networks, in which faithful murids are bound together by 
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virtue of their common spiritual loyalty to a charismatic Sheikh or Pir, have regularly 
emerged within, and driven the development of, a multiplicity Islamic transnational networks.  
Changing times, changing opportunities 
Even though there is every reason to believe that numerous trans-local networks spread out 
from South Asia across the Indian Ocean in all directions few significant records survive of 
their activities the period prior to arrival of the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century. As 
the Portuguese were subsequently joined by Dutch, English and French entrepreneurs, the 
region’s indigenous networks were slowly put surely pushed to the periphery – only to 
expand once again within the hegemonic context of European Imperium. Whilst Markovits 
and a host of fellow-historians such as  Timberg (1978), Subramanian (2005) and White 
(1995) have profitably ransacked the imperial archives in order to illuminate the development 
of mercantile networks during this period of European ascendancy, from the late nineteenth 
century a new phenomenon began to emerge: long-distance voluntary migration to fill vacant 
niches in the labour market, initially in tropical locations in parts of Britain’s overseas 
empire, and in the aftermath of the second World War, in the imperial homeland itself. 
Similar developments also took place in all the other European states who had successfully 
constructed similar global empires.  
 
On the face of it the agendas pursued by South Asia’s labour migrants, as well as the niches 
which they initially sought to colonise, differ strikingly in character from those pursued by 
their mercantile predecessors. But before hardening up this categorical distinction, several 
key factors are worth noting. On the one hand the niches into which free labour migrants (as 
opposed to their indentured counterparts) inserted themselves underwent gradual expansion, 
such that metropolitan opportunities only opened up on a significant scale in the aftermath of 
the second World War; and on the other the labour migrants, and especially those who went 
overseas as fare-paying ‘passengers’ rather than as indentured servants soon proved to be no 
less entrepreneurial in their outlook than their merchant counterparts. To be sure they started 
out with far less in the way of capital resources, but once the second generation began to 
enter overseas labour markets the strategic initiatives deployed by those standing on each side 
of this initially fundamental divide become swiftly began to fade. The reasons for this are 
quite straightforward. The specific character of the strategies deployed by those punching 
their way upward ‘from below’ is of necessity determined by the character of the more-or-
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less empty niches overseas which they manage firstly to identify, and then to progressively 
colonise; likewise their tactical success in exploiting the opportunities so identifies is largely 
determined by their capacity to deploy the resources of their cultural capital – and above all 
their capacity for network-building – as a means of making the most of them. If those 
resources are to a large extent a function of the regionally specific conventions of kinship and 
marriage which those involved routinely deployed,  regardless of whether their families’ prior 
occupation was as merchants, peasant-farmers or as skilled craftsmen, such a convergence 
could only to be expected to occur once the processes of colony construction got firmly under 
way.  
 
However this is not to suggest that such tactical convergence led to the disappearance of the 
underlying disjunctions. Far from it: since the patterns of reciprocity remained firmly 
network-based, and since their intrinsically parochial character was further reinforced by 
endogamous marriages within each of them, alliances between parallel networks were slow to 
develop. So it is that even to this day the majority of South Asian transnational networks 
remain remarkably caste and biraderi specific. What is equally striking is that whilst these 
endogamous disjunctions have been sustained across the board, the character of the 
entrepreneurial strategies adopted by members of networks with similar regional roots – such 
as the Gujaratis, the Punjabis, the Potoharis, the Sylhetis and the Ismaelis – are broadly 
similar in each case.   
 
How are such differentials best explained? One popular approach is to rely on self-serving 
and hugely generalised stereotypes, to the effect, for example, that Gujaratis are inherently 
‘business-minded’, while Punjabis and Pathans are ‘militaristic’, whilst the Sylhetis have a 
unique commitment to cookery. In my view such tautologies obscure far more than they 
illuminate. A better approach is one which takes explicit cognisance of the localised features 
of cultural capital on which migrants from specific regions were in a position to draw, 
together with their equally specific historical and environmental contingencies with which 
they found themselves confronted. From that perspective two sets of resources have been of 
particular significance. Firstly the characteristics of the local economy (both historical and 
contemporary) from which the migrant outflow emerged, and secondly the varied ways in 
which emigrants drew on their conventions of kinship and marriage as they set about 
constructing their translocal networks (see Ballard 2003, 1983).  
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Kinship, marriage and network construction 
From this perspective those emigrants who emerged from communities within which multi-
generational extended households were the order of the day, and especially those households 
which are patrilineally extended descent groups – as is the case in much of northern India 
(see, for example Kessinger 1978) – found themselves equipped with a ready-made template 
around which to construct such networks. But although this in no way precluded members of 
communities whose households were less strongly corporate in character, and where  descent 
groups are much less well developed (as amongst the Sylhetis (Gardner 1995) for example) 
from becoming transnationally active. However the difference had a significant impact on the 
speed and efficiency with which they constructed global networks, such that those 
constructed by Punjabis turned out be substantially more immediately resourceful than were 
their Sylheti counterparts.  
 
But whilst pre-existent ties of patrilineal descent provided an extremely convenient 
framework around which to build translocal networks during the pioneering (and hence 
usually all-male) phases of expansion, no less for merchants than for than for their labour-
migrant successors, the maintenance construction of fully fledged ethnic colonies – as 
opposed to mere outposts – could never be achieved on an all-male basis. As the provision of 
institutional stability to their networking enterprises became a matter of ever greater priority, 
so ties of marriage came to be viewed as just as a valuable resource as those of descent. There 
were two main reasons for this. Once migrants brought their wives overseas to join them – 
instead of taking periodic furloughs back to their home base – fully fledged households began 
to emerge at their destination. But whilst family reunion brought overseas colonies to live as 
never before, in no way did this lead to translocal connections falling into abeyance. On the 
contrary there was a strong sense in which they were actively reinforced. Existing 
connections were doubled up, since wives invariably remained in contact with their own natal 
kin, but the birth of children opened up the possibility of developing further strategic ties 
once offspring reached marriageable age.  
 
Whilst such strategic alliances were initially largely utilised as a means of maintaining 
bilateral ties between each colony and its home base, once networks expanded to include a 
multiplicity of colonies, marriage could be used to construct strategically valuable ties 
between them, and hence yet further facilitate the circulation of personnel within the network.  
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Indeed in those communities in which inter-colony linkages became particularly intense – as 
for example amongst the Khoja and Bohra Ismaili Muslims whose original home-base was in 
Karachi – their scale and frequency became so strong that they began to move ‘offshore’, 
such that their centre of gravity moved from the West coat of India to East Africa, and thence 
to the west coast of North America.   
 
What is also striking is the extent to which these developments were further conditioned by 
an issue which we have not as yet explored: the precise format of the marriage rules deployed 
within each such community. Amongst the Hindus, Sikhs and Jains of northern India, and 
amongst many of the upper caste Hindu groups who converted to Islam, marriage rules not 
only require endogamy within the caste, but proscribe marriages with members of one’s own 
patrilineal descent group, and very often with anyone drawn from one’s mother’s and 
mother’s mother’s decent group as well. When marriages with anyone remotely recognisable 
as kinsfolk are proscribed, it not only follows that all marriages have to be negotiated from 
scratch, but also that all marriages are significantly translocal – at least in the sense that 
brides are routinely recruited from families resident in villages lying some distance away 
from those in which they come to join their husbands and in-laws.  
 
By contrast many Muslim communities, and most especially those resident in the northern 
parts of what is now Pakistan follow a quite different set of conventions. In these contexts 
marriage rules are closely conjoined with the rules of incest, with the result that whilst sexual 
relationships with the close kin specified in Leviticus are proscribed as illegitimate, marriage 
with cousins of all kinds are not only permissible, but actively encouraged. Indeed in many 
such communities well over 50% of marriages take place between cousins.2 Where this is so 
most marriages are anything but trans-local: on the contrary they are much more likely to 
take place with the girl next door. But whilst the presence of these marriage rules has in no 
way inhibited members of such communities from constructing transnational networks 
(Ballard 2008, Charsley 2007, Shaw 2000), they have nevertheless had a very significant 
impact on the way in which those networks have developed over time. Hence whilst 
‘offshore’ marriage alliances fairly rapidly became the norm in communities where all such 
unions had to be negotiated afresh, as is the case where marriage with close kin is proscribed, 
in those where marriages between cousins is the norm overseas settlers have found 
                                                 
2  Although their marriage rules are not derived from Levitical specifications, the Parsees likewise have 
no objection to marriages between cousins. 
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themselves under intense pressure to arrange their children’s marriages with the offspring of 
their siblings back home, with the result off-shore (as opposed to back-home) unions have so 
far remained a great deal less frequent – all of which has had strong differential impact on 
patterns of adaptation and upward mobility as between the two sets of communities (Ballard 
1990, 2003a, 2003b).  
 
Last but not least it is also worth noting that such strategic marriage alliances are by no 
means necessarily driven solely by parental preferences, even when they result in marriages 
between overseas-based spouses and with cousins who have grown up in deepest rural 
Pakistan (Shaw and Charsley 2006).  Likewise as Raj records in her study of Punjabi Hindu 
Khatri and Brahmin families based in London, but who trace their origins to towns and cities 
which have been located in Pakistan since 1947, long-established patterns of endogamy are 
still as strongly supported by young people themselves as they are by their parents. Indeed in 
their case it is the youngsters as much as the elders who lead the search for suitable spouses, 
frequently through specialist on-line matrimonial sites with a global span. As she goes on to 
note:  
The transnational nature of these advertisements is also apparent in their reference 
to origins (from Africa), to workplace (working for a US. company in the United 
Kingdom), and to choice of potential spouse (United Kingdom or United States). It is 
also relevant that this might implicate how they wish their culture to be perceived, 
and indeed how they perceive themselves as variously Indian, multicultural 
(Punjabi/West), Indian (Punjabi), and Punjabi. (Raj 2002: 105 ff) 
What is abundantly clear from her analysis is that the HPs, as they often describe themselves, 
now form a necessarily off-shore community, in the sense that their homeland West Punjab 
has been inaccessible for half a century. ) Hence even though the vast majority of HPs have 
by now never set eyes on their homeland, they are nevertheless acutely aware of the 
distinctiveness of the community into which they have been born. Nevertheless their on-
going commitment to endogamy is by no means solely grounded to a sentimental 
commitment to the maintenance of its integrity. Rather as Raj graphically demonstrates it is 
at least as much grounded in an acute awareness of the extent to which such marriages can 
facilitate further movements upwards and outwards – not least to the United States. Not that 
this is anything new. In pre-British days the Khatris of West Punjab maintained trading 
networks stretched up through the Khyber Pass, across the Hindu Kush and into central Asia. 
The ethnic cleansing of West Punjab was a wholly unexpected contingency. Nevertheless 
their networking capabilities saved the day: they may have been an ancient art, but they also 
proved to be equally adaptive to contemporary conditions, especially for those of their 
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members (by now almost certainly the majority) who are both highly educated and 
professionally well-qualified.  
Indentured labourers 
The significance of kinship in the construction and maintenance of translocal networks is 
further underlined – albeit in negative terms – in the case of those who left the shores of the 
subcontinent on a less than voluntary basis: those recruited as indentured labourers to provide 
an alternative source of labour power to that of slaves for large-scale initiatives in tropical 
agriculture in British colonial possessions such as Mauritius, South Africa, Guyana, Trinidad 
and Fiji. Besides being drawn from poorer sections of the population that their ‘passenger’ 
(or in other words fare-paying) counterparts, indentured labourers were recruited, transported 
and set to work according to the priorities of those to whom they had indentured themselves; 
and since they were mere units of labour as far at their masters were concerned, their own 
priorities counted for nothing until they managed to unbind themselves from the ties of 
indenture in which they were entangled. Since this did not usually occur until at least a 
decade after their arrival at their destination, and often for much longer, the cultural capital 
available to such ‘coolies’ was invariably in much poorer shape – especially in terms of the 
degree to which they had been able to maintain active networks of kinship reciprocity – than 
who had constructed their own self-sustaining escalators of chain migration, so enabling them 
to move overseas as ‘passengers’.  
 
Hence even though the heirs of the indentured labourers did eventually construct ethnic 
colonies whose internal structure continued to owe a great deal to their subcontinental 
heritage, they were invariably much more Creole in character. Moreover the key element of 
the social architecture of the colonies constructed by their more autonomous counterparts –
translocally extended networks of kinship reciprocity – was and indeed remains much more 
feebly articulated in their case. Hence there are excellent reasons for concluding that the 
relatively restricted degree of upward socio-economic mobility which has so far been 
achieved by members of ‘coolie’ communities can be traced to their inability to tap into this 




Although long salient within the subcontinent itself, during the course of the last two decades 
a series Indian-rooted but formally constituted transnational enterprises have leapt into to 
prominent positions in the global commercial order. To be sure Ispat Steel, Tata Enterprises 
and the Reliance Industries have not yet matched corporations such as Shell or Exxon in 
scale: nevertheless they are immediately recognisable as multi-national corporations – almost 
all of which had hitherto had Euro-American roots – of the kind which have come to 
dominate the global economic order. Their appearance raises and immediate question: how 
far has their success been grounded in the deployment of similar strategies to those which we 
have so far been exploring?  
 
Some parallels are immediately apparent, not least because the communities from which the 
great majority of the initiatives have emerged (Marwari, Parsee and Gujarati Bania in the 
cases cited) were in any event precisely those which have long been heavily engaged in trans-
local and transnational commercial activities: in other words they have been following well-
worn paths, albeit with unprecedented success. Moreover it is quite clear that during the early 
phases of business expansion, virtually all such enterprises made extensive use of kin and 
community-based network of reciprocity to provide the core of their organisational structure; 
indeed the inner core of most such enterprises is still structured in precisely that way to this 
day. Nevertheless once such enterprises grow to a certain scale, it becomes impossible – and 
indeed commercially inefficient – to continue to order recruitment on such a particularistic 
fashion. Merit must ultimately out-trump connectedness if such businesses are to survive. 
Nevertheless there are strong indications that the recruitment strategies of most South Asian 
transnational corporations is such that the vast majority of those filling managerial and 
executive positions in overseas locations (as well as those located in the subcontinent itself) 
are themselves of South Asian origin.  
 
Of course the Indian educational system – often supplemented by post-graduate studies in the 
US or Australia – now produces a plethora of well-educated professionals. Merit is 
consequently a relatively plentiful commodity. Nevertheless there are good reasons to believe 
that there are further factors at work here: namely that the patterns of mutual interaction 
which the staff of such enterprises are expected to maintain as between one another are 
grounded in a much greater sense of mutual reciprocity, as well of hierarchy, than anything 
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which would normally be found within the context of a Euro-American multinational 
corporation. In other words the behaviours associated with South Asian conventions of quasi-
kinship appear to play a key role in the managerial and executive structures of multi-national 
corporations currently emerging from below, so much so that there good reasons for 
supposing that they play go a long way towards explaining the source of the competitive 
advantage which has precipitated their commercial success.  
 
This argument can also be played the other way round. One of the key features of the success 
of multinational corporations during the course of the twentieth century has been their 
capacity to facilitate the circulation of goods, credit, capital, manpower and profits to the 
collective advantage of the corporation as a whole – precisely the features which Markovits 
identifies as being characteristic of merchant networks operating in and around the Indian 
Ocean. With this in mind it is also underscoring a point which has been implicit in the 
discussion so far: that all such networks, whether they operate trans-locally or trans-
jurisdictionally, hegemonically ‘from above’ or transgressively ‘from below’, no matter 
whether they are set in historical or contemporary contexts, all set out to pursue precisely the 
same multifaceted circulatory objectives.  
The impact of the post-colonial world order 
However even if there is nothing new about the operation of such networks themselves, the 
context within which they operate has recently changed dramatically, and not just in terms of 
radical advances in communications technology. Following the collapse of all the worlds’ 
empires – including that of Russia – there has been a veritable explosion in the number of 
nation states, all of whom fiercely guard their jurisdictional autonomy. Hence if international 
activity has increased by leaps and bounds during the course of the past half century, it is at 
least in part because the globe is transected by a quite unprecedented number of national 
boundaries, all of which provide substantial opportunities for arbitrage. In these 
circumstances trans-local arenas have come into their own in an unprecedented fashion, since 
they can now be utilised to transfer goods, credit, capital, manpower across the innumerable 
national boundaries and financial jurisdictions to their members’ advantage. This has led to a 
further transformation in the character of the world order. 
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As Beck has noted this new order has enabled transnational corporations to gain access to 
what he describes as a ‘translegal’ arena, in which they can conduct their business on an 
autonomous basis without formally contravening any laws, and without the consent of any 
specific parliament or government. He goes on to expand his point thus:  
Translegal means transnational meta-power, inasmuch as the latter reflects and 
systematically exploits the cooperative advantages and hidden niches of different 
national legal systems for purposes of expanding global business power (Beck 2006: 
72).  
But whilst Beck presents his argument in terms of the achievements of formally constituted 
multi-national corporations operating hegemonically from above, all manner of other trans-
local networks have also begun to exploit the opportunities for arbitrage as between those 
self-same inter-jurisdictional niches. There is, however, one vital difference between the two. 
Whilst the activities of Euro-American multinational corporations are for the most part 
regarded with approbation, at least by the representatives of what currently passes as ‘the 
international community’, similar strategies deployed from other sources, and most especially 
those emanating ‘from below’, are viewed from a quite different perspective. Far from being 
granted the benefit of the doubt, such networks – and especially those constructed by and on 
behalf of migrant workers – they have come to be viewed with ever-increasing alarm, 
especially by those who view themselves as representatives of the ‘international community’. 
As a result ever more extensive efforts are currently being made to constrain, and indeed to 
criminalise the translegal strategies on which members of such groups have relied in the 
process of augmenting their growing transgressive, rather than hegemonic, trans-
jurisdictional meta-power. Not that this should come as any great surprise: it is political 
interests, rather than any kind of concern for equity and justice, which are the primary source 
of the contemporary driving forces in this arena.  
 
That multinational corporations take extensive advantage of their translegal status to deploy 
strategies of transfer pricing  to ensure that bulk of their profits emerge in conveniently low-
taxed jurisdictions is well known (Baker 2005, Chang 2007); likewise the staff of 
multinational institutions encounter no significant visa restrictions as they move around 
between their globally distributed local offices: indeed as processes of globalisation from 
above spread ever more widely, the presence of such branches is invariably regarded as a sign 
of progress, as localities which had previously been regarded as backwaters can at long last 
feel that they have placed themselves ‘on the map’ as far as global activity is concerned.  
Hence only the most churlish of nationalists now refuse to welcome such representatives of 
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‘international’ business. However parallel initiatives ‘from below’ are invariably viewed as 
far less welcome. So in world increasingly committed to the ideology free trade promulgated 
by the World Trade Organisation, how can such transnational initiatives ‘from below’ be 
successfully – and above all legally – repulsed?  
Formal and Informal networks in a post 9/11 world 
Although contemporary Euro-American transnational networks typically bear down from 
above, most particularly with respect to the global South, whilst those emanating from the 
South strike transgressively upward from below, their objectives in each case are very 
similar: namely to stretch their tentacles into whatever niches in the global economy their 
members have the skills and resources to exploit, to the collective material benefit of network 
members. How then, can non-discriminatory legal structures be developed in such a way to 
promote – or at least to turn a blind eye – to the activities of the former, whilst also providing 
a legitimate means of curbing and/or criminalising the latter?  
 
The solution to that conundrum that has recently begun to crystallise is most illuminating, 
since it largely overlooks the functional purpose of such transactions – the transfer of capital, 
goods and personnel across national boundaries with the minimal level of interference from 
state authorities – but focuses instead on the structural character of the networks through 
which they are implemented. Hence whilst the activities of networks which are organised as 
formally constituted and audited corporations are routinely regarded as ipso facto legitimate, 
and continue to be so regarded despite the endlessly contorted internal structures they 
regularly devise to avoid significant external scrutiny. By contrast transactions implemented 
though networks which are not fully legally incorporated from end to end, and instead rely on 
informal relationships of mutual reciprocity to achieve exactly the same ends, are allowed no 
such privileges.Instead such ‘shadowy’, ‘underground’ and ‘unaccountable’ networks are 
regularly regarded as inherently suspicious and potentially criminal.  
 
These tendencies reached their apotheosis in the immediate after of  9/11, which saw the 
passage on the USA PATRIOT Act (whose full title is Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism), which was 
passed into law Congress less than two months of the collapse of the twin towers. Once of the 
central purposes of the act was to criminalise the operation of such networks, not just within 
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the U.S., but on a global scale. From our perspective there sections of the Act are of 
particular significance: Title III, Title IV, and Title VIII. 
 
Title III: The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act 
The most significant innovation introduced by this section of the Act was the introduction of 
a swathe of ‘know your customer’ regulations with which all banks – not just those operating 
within the United States, but also all overseas banks who maintained correspondent accounts 
with US banks, record, and where necessary to make available to the authorities, the personal 
details of all the customers on whose behalf they transferred funds across their jurisdictional 
borders via New York. Since the US dollar is currently the global medium exchange, the 
central consequence of this rule that was all Banks who wished to continue participating in 
the global banking system found themselves required to followed US regulatory 
prescriptions, and to place themselves in a position where they could provide US regulators 
with details of the originator and the ultimate beneficiary of all the cross-jurisdictional value 
transfers. 
 
By way of comment it is worth noting that this initiative can usefully be seen as a form of 
trans-jurisdictional network extension, such all those non-US banks (and a host of other 
financial agencies) which maintained correspondent accounts on Wall Street were also 
required to place themselves in a position where they could vouch for the credibility and the 
respectability of all their customers. As a result the ‘bad guys’ – including those people for 
whose personal reliability local banks could not confidently vouch – would find themselves 
excluded from access to legitimate trans-jurisdictional financial networks.  
 
The nominal objective of this new global regulatory structure was to lay bare the financial 
sinews which underpinned an emergent global threat: drugs smuggling and terrorism, whose 
networks the US authorities had so far been unable, pace 9/11, to penetrate. However those 
with their ears close to the ground soon realised that those most vulnerable to finding 
themselves charged with ‘currency crimes’ were operators in the IVTS/Hawala sector had 
begun to expand the transfer of remittances of migrant workers who had established 
themselves in the prosperous North  to their kinsfolk in the impoverished South into a multi-
billion dollar industry, largely because the services they provided were cheaper, swifter and 
more convenient than those on offer from formally constituted banks. However neither the 
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US nor the UK authorities were much interested in theses of this kind. Instead they took their 
cue from the Patriot Act, and insisted that these networks primary function was to enable 
terrorists and drug-smugglers criminals could launder their ill-gotten assets. Goaded by 
FinCEN, an agency of the US Treasury, the authorities on both sides of the Atlantic began to 
switch their attention from Terrorists and Drugs Smugglers (whom they were finding it 
exceedingly difficult to track down) towards a much more accessible surrogate, the value 
transfer operators themselves. From this perspective the anti-money laundering provisions of 
the Patriot Act have met with considerable success, in the sense that they have provided the 
authorities in both the USA and the UK to prosecute local agents of IVTS/Hawala systems as 
‘money-launderers’, who have promptly found themselves heavily fined, as well as being 
given  substantial prison sentences. However there is little evidence that these initiatives have 
of themselves enabled the authorities to track down many criminals or terrorists – or that they 
have significantly crippled the capacity of South Asian transnational networks to facilitate 
global financial transfers (Ballard 2006, Passas 2008).  
 
Title IV: Border Security  
This section of the Act had even wider implications, since its central objective was to subject 
all those entering the United States from foreign jurisdictions tighter scrutiny than hitherto, 
amongst other things by authorising the authorities to construct comprehensive data-banks of 
the history and personal characteristics of all those crossing, or seeking to cross its borders. 
Just as in the financial sphere, initiatives of this kind have since been emulated in many 
European jurisdictions. But just as with all the other sections of the Patriot Act, the 
demographic impact of these initiatives has been markedly differential in character: indeed 
there can be little doubt that that was their very purpose. Only a minor sleight of hand was 
required to re-jig provisions which were nominally designed to target gangs of criminals and 
terrorists towards a convenient surrogate: the informal networks deployed by migrant 
workers in general, and those of Muslim origin in particular to transgress the jurisdictional 
boundaries which had been designed to exclude them. In other words the ‘War on Terror’ has 
provided a means whereby the prosperous states of Euro-America have been able legitimately 
to construct sieve-like border controls which provide no significant obstacles to the passage 
of those who are wealthy enough, well-qualified enough, and above all respectable enough to 
pass muster, whilst systematically excluding all others.  
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But just what was being secured behind these borders? Speaking as Secretary of Defense, 
Donald Rumsfeld spelt out both his concerns and his preferred response when he announced 
that:   
Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a 
strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism. We 
have learned that an unrivalled capacity to respond to traditional challenges is no 
longer sufficient. Battlefield success is only one element of our long-term, multi-
faceted campaign against terrorism. Non-military components of this campaign 
include strategic communications, law enforcement operations, and economic 
sanctions [my italics] (United States National Defense Strategy, 2005).  
 
One of the most remarkable features of Rumsfeld’s argument is that he – or at least his 
advisors – may have been reading some anthropology. His suggestion that terrorists have 
begun utilise underhand strategies which he identifies as underhand ‘weapons of the weak’ is 
quite remarkable, since his terminology appears to be derived from the well-known 
exploration of that very phenomenon by James Scott (1985). But if this is indeed the case, 
Rumsfeld’s (mis)reading of Scott’s arguments is most illuminating, since it overlooks the 
core of Scott’s thesis: namely that the ‘arts of resistance’ are the outcome of dialectic 
processes, and hence can only be properly appreciated when understood as counter-
hegemonic responses to the experience of domination (Scott 1990). Hence whilst Scott would 
agree that all such strategies are inherently subversive, although he also prefers to view them 
from a positive, rather than a negative, perspective. Moreover a key point in his analysis of 
the effectiveness of such strategies of resistance ‘from below’ is that it arises from their 
inherent alterity – the capacity to think and act ‘outside the box’ by standing the premises 
which underpin what Scott describes as ‘public transcripts’ on their heads, so enabling them 
to make the most of the strategic assets available within their own self-generated resources of 
cultural capital.  
Title VIII: Terrorism and criminal law 
However all this also now has to be understood within the legal jurisdiction which the Patriot 
Act sought to establish. From this perspective Rumsfeld’s arguments – on the basis of which 
he had already taken the opportunity to identify all those who hade put up armed resistance to 
US military initiatives overseas as ‘illegitimate combatants’ – emerge as being much more 
familiar in character than they may seem at first sight.  Asymmetric conflicts, whether 
military, economic, cultural, racial, ethnic or gendered in character, are regularly 
accompanied by allegations from those who consider that they occupy the moral high ground 
that those seeking to upset the established order are ‘breaking the rules’. Hence they are 
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acting illegitimately at best, and criminally at worst. Contemporary processes of globalisation 
have given rise to innumerable contradictions of this kind. Moreover those with which 
concerned in this volume have been exacerbated by two even more recent, but dialectically 
connected developments. Firstly the position of unchallenged industrial, economic, financial 
and military hegemony which Euro-America has enjoyed on a global scale for the last two 
centuries has begun to crumble; secondly, and just as significantly, the central reason why the 
central reason why this has occurred is that Euro-America has found itself faced by ever more 
intense competitive pressures ‘from below’, based on just the kind of ‘outside the box’ 
strategies which Scott identifies as weapons of the weak.  
 
Unfortunately Donald Rumsfeld appears to have entirely overlooked careful the irony in 
Scott’s formulation: after all he is talking about weapons, even if they are located in the 
hands of ‘the weak’. Moreover as anyone with an iota of historical consciousness is aware, 
the powerless are not necessarily fated to remain in that position for ever after: on the 
contrary their alteric weapons become all the more powerful when their hegemons are so 
locked up in a condition of self-confident hubris that they fail to appreciate just how 
comprehensively those whom they have so long despised have begun to cut the ground from 
beneath their feet.  
 
With such considerations in mind it may well be the case that that the global order may be 
reaching just such a tipping point. After all the current ‘credit crunch’ is not just a product of 
‘irrational exuberance’ in Euro-America. Rather the events of 2008 have taught us that the 
assumption that elaborate derivative contracts grounded in arcane (but formal) mathematical 
calculations, on the back of which a ‘shadow economy’ many times greater than the real 
thing was rapidly constructed, could provide a better and more profitable means of managing 
debt and risk was profoundly mistaken. Now the house of cards has collapsed with still 
unimaginable consequences, perhaps the time has come to recognise that the models 
constructed by proponents of sophisticated modernity lacked any kind of concrete 
foundations, and that those who fail to invest in relationships of personal trust as they 
construct coalitions of reciprocity can only expect to come to a sticky end.  
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Trans-jurisdictional networks and economic development 
All trans-jurisdictional networks are intrinsically redistributive in character, since one of their 
central functions is invariably facilitate the transfer of assets, financial or otherwise, across 
national boundaries to the collective benefit of network members. With such a perspective to 
hand, we also have a ready means of differentiating those which operate ‘from above’ from 
those which operate ‘from below’: those emanating from above invariably serve to 
concentrate wealth in the hands of the already (or at least newly) privileged, whilst those 
emanating from below serve transfer resources in precisely the opposite direction. However it 
is also worth noting that all such evaluations are of necessity contextual in character. Hence 
whilst networks established by labour migrants are undoubtedly redistributive downwards as 
far as the developed world is concerned, in the immediate environment of their home villages 
a lengthy period of successful trans-jurisdictional migration has quite the opposite effect: it 
leads to a relative concentration of wealth in the hands of the immediate beneficiaries of 
those transfers. In the light of that insight I now better appreciate why the Islamabad office of 
DFID remained so disinterested in even considering the prospect of seeking to stimulate 
economic development in Mirpur District, from where close to half of all Pakistani migrant 
workers in Britain have been drawn. Mirpur, they argued, was not poor in a wider Pakistani 
context (Ballard 2003b: 74); hence investing in Mirpur was not congruent with their pro-poor 
agenda. Whilst the logic of their argument was impeccable, it also opens a whole barnful of 
questions about how, if at all, the potential benefits of the arrival of migrant remittances can 
be fitted into currently conventional models of economic development.   
 
Similar (and equally illuminating) questions can also be asked about every dimension of 
trans-jurisdictional activity ‘from below’. As such networkers have grown steadily larger, 
more numerous, and during the course of the past half century, they have begun to 
substantially to reverse the concentration of wealth and power in Euro-American hands which 
took place during the period of Imperial growth ‘from above’. Those processes have taken 
many forms. In addition to the spectacular success of individual entrepreneurs such as 
Lakshmi Mittal and his Chinese counterparts, many millions of more mainstream 
entrepreneurs have utilised the resources of their self-constructed networks to penetrate 
labour markets located throughout the industrialised world. To be sure they may initially have 
been poorly paid by Euro-American terms. Nevertheless the intergenerational transfer of 
resources to which activities have already given rise, and to which their children and their 
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children may well in due course contribute, can only be described as spectacular. Leaving to 
one side the substantial assets which they now control at their overseas destinations, total 
their value of their remittances now greatly exceeds the scale of North-South transfers 
delivered as formal development aid (Maimbo and Ratha 2005). Better still such transfers 
incurs no external debt, and arrive with none of the usual strings attached. 
 
However value transfers totalling well in excess of $300 billion per annum attract all sorts of 
suspicious and greedy eyes, no less to those in command of the national economy of every 
state in which such value transfers arrive than in the US Treasury or the Department of 
Homeland Security. But just who has rights in such trans-jurisdictionally acquired treasure? 
What state agencies, if any, have a right to regulate its transfer, to tax it, to direct its 
investment or to securitize the inflow in order to raise loans on the global money markets? 
How much, in other words, should these transgressors of the established order be allowed to 
get away with? Should they be placed in the same category as kleptocrats such as Mobutu 
and Suharto, and every effort made to strip them of their criminal assets? 
I think not. It should never be forgotten that that glocal networks ‘from below’ of the kind 
which I have highlighted in this Chapter have deeply parochial foundations, and are driven 
by, and indeed a manifestation of, the collective interests of network members themselves. 
Precisely because of their parochial character these interests are not congruent with those of 
the population at large within their homeland, or of those in any of the overseas jurisdictions 
in which they touch ground. Not that they are in any sense unique in so doing: trans-
jurisdictional networks operating from above do so on a much more massive scale. Given that 
the availability of such transfer mechanisms is a central feature of globalisation, there appears 
to be no prospect whatsoever pulling this particular genie back into the bottle. If so, it seems 
that such flows – as well as the trans-jurisdictional networks which give rise to, is a 
phenomenon with which we will all have come to terms, no matter how much Secretaries of 
State such as Donald Rumsfeld may rattle swords.  
With this in mind it is worth recalling Dhooleka Raj’s reminder that members of trans-
jurisdictional networks deepest loyalties are to other members of their corporate network, 
wherever they may be located, rather than to any specific spatial location. To be sure their 
success may be powerfully transgressive in the sense that they reduce the extent of the 
Imperially-generated disjunction between the global North and the global South. However it 
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is a great mistake to assume that those involved a pursuing such objectives do so as 
‘Southerners’, or even as citizens of any given state. The trans-jurisdictional space within 
which such networks operate simultaneously more parochially and more globally oriented to 
be constrained by such artificial constructs as national boundaries, not least because they 
have long since developed the skills and strategies which enable them to puncture such facile 
barriers at will.  
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